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Introduction1 
 
Over the past years, scepticism regarding the European Union in European mass 
publics has become increasingly evident. The failure of the constitutional treaty to 
gain majority support in France and in the Netherlands has marked the definite end of 
the “permissive consensus” among European publics that had allowed European 
integration to proceed since the late 1950s. The precise nature of the recent surge of 
Euroscepticism, however, remains poorly understood to date. Little work in a 
genuinely comparative perspective has been undertaken to assess whether opposition 
against European integration primarily reflects national idiosyncrasies or if there are 
common patterns across countries.  
In this paper, I suggest that opposition against European integration can have 
economic or cultural motives, which have diverging consequences for the future 
prospects of the integration project. A first form of Euroscepticism is related to the 
perception that market building in the EU has committed national governments to a 
liberalizing thrust in economic policy making and endangers the achievements of 
national welfare states. Consequently, as long as “positive integration” does not 
prevail over “negative integration”, in Scharpf’s (1996) terms, citizens with strongly 
state interventionist attitudes will oppose further integration efforts. 
The second source of opposition against the EU is culturally and politically based, 
and reflects a more fundamental concern with the establishment of a supranational 
European polity. The integration process diminishes the autonomy of the nation state 
and establishes a new political community in which collectively binding decisions are 
taken. Both aspects clash with the orientations of citizens that hold what I call 
traditionalist or communitarian conceptions of community. These citizens believe that 
politics at the national level should remain autonomous and should prevail over 
decisions taken at the EU-level. Such a conception of community is incompatible with 
the sense of European identity that is a prerequisite to the functioning of the enlarged 
European Union, as suggested by Fuchs (2008).  
                                                
1 This paper was written within the project “EU enlargement, cultural diversity and national identity”, 
directed by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, and supported by the EU-Consent Network. I 
would like to thank all the participants of Team 12, and especially Hans-Dieter Klingemann, for their 
most valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper. This paper also draws on research 
conducted in the project “National Political Change in Borderless Spaces. A Comparative 
Assessment of the Impact of Globalization on National Party Systems” (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008). 
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A second key hypothesis advanced in this paper is that the potential for 
politicization of European integration – which has been termed a “sleeping giant” by 
van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) – is exploited to a far greater degree by national 
parties than is often assumed. One of the key obstacles to understanding how national 
and European conflicts relate has been the misconception that political space at the 
national level is structured by a one-dimensional left-right dimension. If this 
assumption was ever warranted, this is certainly no longer the case since the rise of 
the New Left and the subsequent counter-mobilization of the extreme populist right 
has brought a new cultural conflict to the core of Western European party systems 
(Bornschier 2005, 2010, Kriesi et al. 2006). As I will argue, the basic structure of 
conflict across the old members of the Union is such that the politicization of the 
integration process is likely. In fact, the two types of opposition against the European 
project derive from distinctive positions regarding the two central dimensions of 
conflict in national party systems across Western Europe.  
Whether or not contrasting attitudes regarding European integration are actually 
mobilized, however, depends on the strategic choices of political parties. In this 
respect, I argue that the configuration of the respective national party system is 
crucial. Because the major parties tend to be internally divided regarding the 
integration issue, the full mobilization of the two forms of opposition against 
European integration depends on the existence of a split both within the left and 
within the right of the political spectrum. In particular, I expect the cultural potential 
of contestation of the EU to be mobilized only in those party systems where a party of 
the extreme populist right is present. 
While prior research on party positions at the aggregate level has found that 
positions along an economic and a cultural dimension at the national level are related 
to party stances on European integration (Hooghe et al. 2002, Marks et al. 2006), this 
paper makes at least four additional contributions. First, it offers a more elaborate 
theoretical explanation as to why the new cultural line of conflict prevalent in 
Western Europe is related to European integration. Secondly, it draws attention to the 
differing implications of the two logics of rejection for the formation of a European 
identity, and, consequently, the future of the integration process. Thirdly, I take a 
closer look at national context conditions that determine whether opposition against 
the EU is mobilized or not. As it turns out, the pattern detected by Marks et al. (2006) 
does not apply in Scandinavia, Portugal, and Greece, and thus cannot claim general 
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status. Fourth, my analysis does not focus on the positions of political parties, but on 
the potential for contestation of European integration at the voter level, which parties 
may or may not mobilize. Where citizen orientations regarding the EU prove to be 
structured by partisanship, this indicates that parties have effectively mobilized 
opposition against European integration. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, I depict how the major 
dimensions of conflict in Western European party systems have been transformed in 
recent decades and how this leads to something of a “natural association” between 
national and European political preferences. Furthermore, I discuss how the 
configuration of national party systems impinges on the mobilization of opposition 
against the EU. In the second section, I use Eurobarometer data from the mid-1990s to 
empirically determine the dimensions underlying citizen orientations regarding the 
EU. As it turns out, three forms of Euroscepticism are discernible across the 15 old 
member countries of the EU, two of which correspond closely to the economic and 
cultural logics of rejection depicted above. In a second step, I investigate to which 
degree parties have mobilized opposition against the European project. The results 
show that the cultural opposition has been more strongly mobilized, and primarily in 
those countries where the extreme populist right has achieved an electoral 
breakthrough. The final section presents a re-analysis of the dimensions underlying 
European citizens after the 2004 eastward enlargement. Here, I test the claim that 
scepticism regarding the enlargement of the Union is likely to become integrated into 
the economic dimension of opposition against the EU.  
 
National Political Conflict and European Integration 
 
Until recently, models of conflict in the European Union have used the left-right 
dimension of conflict to derive hypotheses on the relationship between ideological 
oppositions at the national level and positions regarding the EU (see the overview in 
Steenbergen and Marks 2004). Together with the finding that opposition against 
European integration comes both from the extreme left and the extreme right, they 
have concluded that the issue fits uneasily in the structure of national conflicts (e.g., 
van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). A different picture emerges, however, if political 
4 
space is conceived as structured by an economic and a cultural dimension of conflict 
(Kitschelt 1994, Bornschier 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006).  
Similarly to the national political space, attitudes regarding the European Union 
are also likely to be structured by at least two dimensions. On the one hand, market 
integration is a highly political process in that the desired degree of re-regulation at 
the European level depends on preferences regarding the welfare state and economic 
liberalism. On the other hand, the integration process has important cultural and 
political implications. It establishes a new political community that competes with the 
established national community for democratic decision making competences. It 
entails a loss of national autonomy that at least some citizens are likely to resist. 
While a first generation of research has focused on narrow economic cost-benefit 
factors, more recent studies have underlined the important role of identity in 
determining support for the EU (McLaren 2006, Hooghe, Marks 2004). 
As I will argue, potential conflicts over European integration grounded in 
economic preferences and in citizens’ identities correspond to disputes that also play 
an important role in national politics. While this is relatively straightforward in the 
case of economic conflicts, it also applies to the cultural domain. In fact, the cultural 
conflicts prevalent in party oppositions in Western Europe are closely related to 
cultural issues and anxieties raised by European integration. The next step is therefore 
to present a brief picture of the nature of cultural conflicts in the advanced industrial 
nations of Western Europe. 
 
 
The rise of the new cultural conflict between libertarian-universalistic and 
traditionalist-communitarian values 
 
In the aftermath of 1968, new political issues came up that had more to do with values 
and life-styles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. The mobilization of the 
New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s brought these new issues onto the 
political agenda, resulting in a two-dimensional structure in Western European party 
systems, as Kitschelt (1994) has shown. Cutting across the “old” distributional axis, a 
cultural line of conflict opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to 
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structure the attitudes of voters.2 On the political left, the prominence of cultural 
liberalism has given rise to the establishment of Ecologist parties and a transformation 
of Social Democratic parties early on in the 1980s. Whereas a counter-potential to the 
libertarian movements was evident early on in Western publics (Sacchi 1998), its 
political manifestation was delayed as compared to that of the New Left. Being 
essentially conservative, its underlying values and goals were more diffuse, and their 
political manifestation therefore depended more heavily on political leadership.  
In the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries have 
succeeded in putting new issues on the political agenda that have proven highly 
conductive to collective identity formation, and consequently, to political 
mobilization. Despite their diverse origins, these parties have converged on a 
programmatic profile that involves two elements: First of all, the populist right 
challenges the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left, and questions the 
legitimacy of political decisions that enact universalistic values. More importantly, the 
populist right has promoted new issues and developed new discourses, such as their 
anti-immigration stance. This does not involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz 
(2004) has called “differentialist nativism” or “cultural racism”, and represents a 
counter-vision to multicultural models of society. Both groups of issues are 
theoretically as well as empirically situated at one pole of a new line of conflict that 
may be labelled libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian. As a 
consequence, right-wing populist parties seem to have converged on a programmatic 
profile that makes this party family represent the counter-pole to the libertarian left 
(Bornschier 2010).  
The opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian 
values is, at heart, a conflict over the role of community. It is at the centre of an 
ongoing philosophical debate between liberals and communitarians, opposing 
individualist and communitarian conceptions of the person. Communitarians such as 
Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) argue that universalistic principles may violate 
cultural traditions within an established community and therefore engender the danger 
of being oppressive. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of 
universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and 
                                                
2 Following Kitschelt’s (1994) as well as Flanagan and Lee’s (2003) usage, I will use the term 
“libertarian” to denote a culturally liberal position compatible with an interventionist state, and not as 
an all-embracing call for a minimal state, as is the case in Nozick’s (1974) conception.  
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widely shared cultural practices. Communitarians urge us to acknowledge the fact that 
our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic conception 
of the self is misconceived. Although many communitarian thinkers only propose a 
(more or less modest) communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate 
has provided theoretical grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic 
principles advocated by Rawls (1971). Philosophical currents of the European New 
Right have borrowed from communitarian conceptions of community and justice in 
their propagation of the concept of “cultural differentialism”, claiming not the 
superiority of any nationality or race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to 
preserve their distinctive traditions. In turn, this discourse has proved highly 
influential for the discourse of right-wing populist parties (Antonio 2000, Minkenberg 
2000). Immigration is directly linked to this conflict since the inflow of people from 
other cultural backgrounds endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the 
New Right as well as exponents of right-wing populist parties deem necessary to 
preserve. Equally present in communitarian thinking, as well as in the discourse of the 
populist right, is a defence of the primacy of politics over abstract normative 
principles. 
Right-wing populist parties from the 1990s on can be distinguished from other 
parties by virtue of three commonalities: (i) a location at the traditionalist-
communitarian extreme of the new cultural divide; (ii) a populist anti-establishment 
discourse, in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established 
parties, and (iii) a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist 
parties (Bornschier 2010). Empirically, the defence of cultural tradition and the 
rejection of multicultural society propagated by the populist right form one pole of the 
new division structuring the political space in a number of Western European 
countries. Cultural liberalism and the individualistic and universalistic conceptions of 
community advocated by the New Left form the opposing pole (Bornschier 2005, 
Kriesi et al. 2006). 
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The relationship between economic and cultural conflicts at the national level and the 
question of European integration 
 
The rising importance of the supranational EU polity in political life in Europe 
establishes a new political community within which collectively binding decisions are 
taken. Citizens holding libertarian-universalistic values will probably not find this 
threatening. First of all, they are characterized by a cosmopolitan outlook, and 
secondly, they will support the “exportation” of the democratic principle to the 
European level, where a substantial part of political decision making now takes place. 
For those adhering to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, on the 
other hand, the situation is different. For them, European integration further threatens 
the autonomy of the national political community that these citizens already see 
endangered, for example by the application of universalistic principles by autonomous 
state agencies such as constitutional courts. Consequently, the populist right has been 
quick to seize the political potential arisen for political actors that insist on the 
primacy of autonomous national politics as against the obligations stemming from 
European integration.  
This cultural or identity-based logic of opposition against the EU is tightly related 
to what may be called the political logic of right-wing populist mobilization. As a 
consequence of commitments in the European Union to liberalize capital flows and 
trade, the policy repertoire available to national governments is constrained, leading 
to problems of legitimacy (see Scharpf 2000, Mény and Surel 2000, Offe 1996). As 
Huber and Stephens show, partisan effects on a whole array of welfare state indicators 
have vanished in the 1980s, when “(…) governments found themselves with 
dramatically fewer options” (Huber, Stephens 2001: 221). Furthermore, many 
governments have explicitly justified unpopular measures in economic and social 
policy making with the structural imperatives of EU-integration and globalization, an 
example being the obligation to fulfil the Maastricht requirements in order to 
participate in the European Monetary Union. Thus, it has been easy for actors of the 
populist right to denounce the “cartelization” of the established parties of the left and 
right, which share a pro-European consensus and allegedly no longer differ in their 
policies. Although European integration has originally only been an important issue 
for certain right-wing populist parties, such as the Swiss People’s Party, its close 
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association with the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian 
dimension of conflict has led other members of this party family to oppose the 
integration process as well. In the 1990s, European integration has increasingly 
gained prominence in the discourse of other members of the right-wing populist party 
family, for example the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party 
(Bornschier 2005, 2010).  
The association between positions along the state-market cleavage and opposition 
against the EU is even more straightforward than in the case of the cultural 
dimension. Conceptions of social justice and of the relative emphasis put on the state 
or the market in economic regulation can be expected to be highly relevant here. After 
all, the policies pursued at the European level are heavily oriented towards the 
economic domain. Thus, attitudes towards deregulation at the national level, re-
regulation at the European level, as well as the degree of harmonization desired in 
social and fiscal policy are presumably related to positions regarding the traditional 
state-market cleavage. Support for European economic policies then is a function of 
economic preferences at the national level and structured by established political 
alignments. More specifically, the extreme left’s opposition against the EU is the 
mirror image of its opposition to economic liberalization and the potential threat it 
poses to national welfare states (Kriesi et al. 2006). It has been argued, however, that 
the European project is no longer neo-liberal in essence, and instead follows a model 
of “regulated capitalism” (Marks et al. 2006: 164). While this position also carries 
some truth, the crucial point is how voters with strongly state interventionist 
preferences evaluate EU-policies, and I will make this an empirical question. 
That said, the limited degree of knowledge most citizens have of the policies 
pursued at the European level may still impede a close relationship between attitudes 
at the two levels. However, given rising levels of information and citizen involvement 
at the European level, diverging conceptions of the aims of European integration and 
of the policies pursued at the European level could be disputed in a representative 
democratic system at the European level. In other words, a rejection of the EU that 
stems from dissatisfaction with its economic policies does not represent a principled 
opposition to the integration process. 
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The mobilization of opposition against European integration 
 
Contrary to the argument presented by Taggart (1998) and partially endorsed by 
Marks et al. (2006), then, the resistance of the extreme left and of the extreme populist 
right has clear ideological foundations and does not stem from their outsider status 
within national political competition. Rather, it is the extreme position of these parties 
within their party systems that makes it easier for them to take a clear position on the 
question of European integration than for the large mainstream parties, which are 
internally divided on the issue (Franklin, van der Eijk and Marsh 1996, Bartolini 
2005, Kriesi et al. 2006). This is also due to the fact that most mainstream parties 
mobilize along both of the two dimensions of conflict that structure national party 
competition,3 which may result in contradictory positions regarding European 
integration. As Marks, Wilson and Ray’s (2002: 587) point out, conservative parties 
can be expected to strongly support economic integration, while opposing further 
efforts at political integration due to their emphasis on national sovereignty. The 
Social Democrats represent the mirror image of the Conservatives, since they are 
much more sceptical regarding economic integration than with respect to the drawing 
up of a supranational polity that could, potentially, engage in European-wide market 
regulation. Right-wing populist parties do not face this dilemma because they 
mobilize only along one of the two national lines of competition, namely, the 
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension. Furthermore, 
they can define their policy stances without prolonged internal debate due to their 
hierarchical internal structure, which has allowed them to quickly take a clear and 
negative position regarding European integration (Bornschier 2010).  
In the following section, the dimensions underlying citizens’ orientations regarding 
the EU are analyzed, testing the hypothesis that these dimensions are related to the 
conflicts that prior research has shown to prevail in national politics. I then proceed to 
verify the hypothesis that the structure of national party systems conditions the 
mobilization of the political potentials created by European integration. 
                                                
3  Bornschier (2010) presents empirical evidence for this fact in France, Germany, and Switzerland. 
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The Dimensionality of Orientations Regarding the European Union 
 
A study of the relationship between national conflicts and orientations regarding the 
European Union has to come to terms with a paucity of appropriate data. Ideally, our 
data source would include orientations regarding (i) the state-market and the 
libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimensions of competition 
at the national level, (ii) the economic and cultural implications of European 
integration, and (iii) respondents’ national party preference. Most cross-national 
surveys, however, do not allow a measurement of respondents’ positions regarding 
both national conflicts I have referred to. Since it has been shown elsewhere that the 
state-market and the new cultural dimension structure political competition in 
Western Europe (Bornschier 2005, 2010, Kriesi et al. 2006), I focus exclusively on 
citizens’ orientations regarding the EU in the further analysis. In a second step, these 
orientations will be related to national party preferences.  
The data source used is the Eurobarometer 44.2bis “Megasurvey” from 1996. 
While this data has the disadvantage of being rather dated and of covering only 15 
EU-member states, it offers a battery of detailed questions pertaining to respondents’ 
fears associated with European integration. Furthermore, the large sample size of 
around 65000 respondents is an advantage. Levels of non-response to single items are 
quite high in these surveys and the large sample boosts the number of respondents 
who declare they would vote for the relatively small parties of the extreme populist 
right and of the extreme left. Furthermore, because the theoretical background of the 
patterns of conflict I have set out is specific to Western Europe, it makes sense to 
disregard the new EU member states in East-Central Europe. This hypothesis is 
corroborated by the analysis of Marks et al. (2006), who find that the relationship 
between party positions along the European and national dimensions differs 
significantly between Eastern and Western Europe. 
Table 1 shows the results of a rotated principal component factor analysis using a 
battery of 16 items that tap respondents’ fears associated with the European Union. 
These questions offer the most detailed information regarding citizens’ orientations 
vis-à-vis the EU, and I have used most of the available items. Among those excluded, 
a few questions pertain to the fear that small states will lose power and that decisions 
in the EU are imposed by the big countries. These questions do not appear 
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comparable across countries, since they are likely to be assessed differently in large 
and in small member states. 
 
Table 1:  Rotated factor analysis of citizens’ perceptions of fear associated with the 
European Union, 1996 
 Cultural  Enlargement  Economic 
 dimension  dimension dimension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurobarometer 44.2bis 
Note: The loss of cases as compared to the original sample size is due to very large number 
of respondents choosing the “don’t know” response category. Given that the answer 
categories are “rather afraid”, “rather not afraid” and “don’t know”, the latter category could 
also be assigned a neutral value. This alternative recoding of missing values does not affect 
the results markedly, however.  
 
The analysis reveals three clearly separated factors. The first factor taps cultural or 
identity-based fears associated with European integration. Loss of identity and culture 
and of the perception that the EU endangers the existence of their nation are important 
features of this syndrome. The factor is also related to fears regarding too rapid 
    
Loss of identity 0.75 0.10 0.18 
Nation no longer exists 0.72 0.11 0.19 
Loss of language 0.67 0.19 0.01 
Too rapid changes 0.52 0.15 0.34 
People too different  0.44 0.31 0.25 
Too much central control 0.41 0.13 0.32 
    
    
Costs eastward enlargement 0.03 0.70 0.24 
Rich countries pay 0.07 0.67 0.15 
Foreign workers from EU 0.21 0.60 0.15 
Countries joining EU 0.29 0.61 0.04 
Massive imports 0.33 0.49 0.22 
Border controls removed 0.42 0.47 -0.01 
    
 
More taxes  0.13 0.17 
 
0.71 
Social security 0.24 0.08 0.67 
Economic crisis 0.14 0.26 0.53 
Transfer of jobs  0.15 0.39 0.46 
     
Eigenvalues     
- before rotation  5.0 1.2 1.005 
- after rotation  2.7 2.6 2.0 
R-square (after rotation) 16.8% 16.2% 12.2% 
 
N   37947  
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changes, that people in the EU are too different to get along well with each other and 
that the EU imposes too much central control. Leaving aside for a moment the second 
factor, the fears underlying the third factor are economic in nature. They pertain to the 
future of national welfare states, to taxes, and to the transfer of jobs to other member 
countries of the EU. Conforming to expectations, the first and the third factors bear 
some resemblance with the central lines of opposition at the national level. The first, 
cultural dimension appears closely associated with the libertarian-universalistic vs. 
traditionalist-communitarian conflict discussed in the preceding section. The third 
factor is related to the state vs. market dimension, or, put differently, the antagonism 
between support for the welfare state and economic liberalism.  
The second factor is not clearly associated with national conflicts, and taps fears 
concerning the consequences of the eastward enlargement of the Union, above all in 
terms of increased economic competition. While the removal of borders loads both on 
the cultural, as well as on the enlargement factor, it is interesting to note that the 
immigration of workers from other EU countries does not seem to represent a cultural 
threat, but is clearly associated with (economic) fears regarding the enlargement 
process. With the eastward enlargement no longer on the agenda in the European 
Union of 27 member states, what used to be scepticism against enlargement may now 
feed into the economic and cultural dimensions, and may contribute to the latter’s 
salience. This hypothesis is tested using more recent survey data in the final section of 
this chapter.  
Because the factor analysis is based on all 15 EU member countries, it may hide 
large differences in the average positions and in the degree of polarization of national 
publics along the three dimensions just discussed. Consequently, the potentials 
constituted by fears regarding the process of European integration may vary across 
countries. Figure 1 presents box plots showing the distribution of respondents along 
the three dimensions in each country. Negative values indicate stronger fears, and 
countries are arranged according to the position of the median citizen. On the one 
hand, the results do not reveal very strong contrasts with respect to the polarization of 
public opinion. In other words, the differing views regarding European integration 
suggest that a potential for the politicization of the issue seems to exist throughout 
Western Europe. At the same time, the results indicate that national publics differ 
rather strongly in their median position. This is particularly true with respect to the 
cultural dimension.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of respondents along the cultural, economic, and 
enlargement dimensions in the 15 old EU member states 
 
If we assume that governments have generally been friendly towards European 
integration, then a particularly strong potential for cultural opposition against the EU 
appears to exist in Portugal, Ireland, Greece. Cultural fears are also widespread in the 
public in Great Britain, but since the major parties are not very Europhile either, the 
potential for parties challenging the mainstream parties is not necessarily large. 
Furthermore, while the median citizen in Belgium and France does not reveal strong 
cultural fears, the rather polarized nature of public opinion in these countries suggests 
that certain segments of the populace are more sceptical. Consequently, it is plausible 
to assume a rather large potential for parties challenging the pro-European 
mainstream. In Denmark, a smaller group of strongly fearful citizens seems to exist. 
With respect to the enlargement and economic dimensions, France, Belgium and 
Greece again stand out for rather sceptic publics. Additionally, a number of countries 
that exhibited little cultural Euroscepticism reveal stronger fears related to the 
economic dimension (Spain) or the enlargement dimension (Luxemburg), or both 
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(Germany). Overall, however, the economic dimension seems to constitute less of a 
potential for contestation of the integration process than the cultural dimension. The 
enlargement dimension, on the other hand, also reveals significant political potentials. 
The preceding section advanced the hypothesis that no fundamental 
incompatibility is to be expected between citizen orientations vis-à-vis the EU and 
national cleavage dimensions. As the empirical analysis has revealed, this is the case 
at least for two of the three dimensions underlying respondents’ orientations regarding 
the EU. Accordingly, the structure of national conflicts does not preclude a 
politicization of the EU along the economic and cultural dimensions. This may 
actually be the reason for what Mair (2000) has called the “limited impact” of 
European integration on national party systems, namely, the near absence of parties 
that are exclusively concerned with the issue of European integration. On the other 
hand, whether or not voters are given a meaningful choice regarding the future of the 
integration process very much depends on the configuration of the national party 
system.  
 
 
The Mobilization of Opposition Against European Unification by 
National Political Parties 
 
The next step is to assess in how far the dimensions found to underlie citizens’ 
orientations regarding the European Union have been mobilized by political parties. 
This question will be approached by positioning party electorates in the political space 
formed by the economic and cultural EU-dimensions, using respondent’s scores from 
the factor analysis carried out in the preceding section. The analysis thus focuses on 
the mobilization of the cultural and economic fears associated with European 
integration, and leaves aside for the moment the question of enlargement. I will return 
to this dimension in a later section. 
As I have argued, the ideological basis of party positions regarding the economic 
and cultural dimensions of integration is rooted in national conflicts: The traditional 
state-market cleavage on the one hand and the new cultural division between 
libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values on the other. 
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Contrary to the purely historical cleavage approach taken by Marks and Wilson 
(2000), however, I argue that positions regarding the EU cannot solely be deduced 
from parties’ cleavage position, but are a result of their ideological credentials in 
interaction with the strategic context of competition in the party system. The 
mobilization of the economic and cultural opposition against the integration project 
thus depends chiefly on the configuration of the party system. While this mobilization 
is likely to occur through reciprocal mass-elite linkages between parties and their 
constituencies (Steenbergen et al. 2007), it is important to acknowledge – in line with 
the perspective developed by Kriesi et al. (2006) – that a differentiation in parties’ 
political offer opens the way for genuine realignments based on the EU issue, both 
within the left and right ideological blocks.  
The mainstream parties of the left and right have generally been favourable to the 
integration process. Because they have commonly been in government, they have also 
participated in the making of the European polity, committing them to a pragmatic 
stance. Economic and culturally based reservations regarding the EU can only find 
expression where there is a division both within the political right, as well as within 
the political left. In particular, the mobilization of the cultural or identity-based fears 
connected to the EU depends on the existence of a right-wing populist party. 
Strategically, the populist right faces no dilemma as long as it does not participate in 
government, since its clear and decisive position along the new cultural divide makes 
it easy to adopt cultural Euroscepticism. On the political left, given a strong 
commitment of the mayor Social Democrat or Socialist parties to the integration 
process, some alternative to these parties must exist for economic fears to become a 
determinant of partisan alignments. I expect this to be the case where a Communist or 
extreme left party exists (or a socialist party as an alternative to the social democrats, 
as in the Netherlands). Extreme left parties are defined here as being located at the 
state-interventionist extreme of the party spectrum along the state-market cleavage. If 
party electorates are located in the two-dimensional space of economic and cultural 
orientations regarding the EU, three patterns emerge, which I discuss in turn. 
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Countries with significant right-wing populist parties 
 
In a first group of countries, the cultural dimension has been more strongly mobilized 
due to the efforts of a successful right-wing populist party that rallies those voters 
who perceive European integration as a cultural threat. These are the cases of France, 
Austria, and Belgium, presented in Figure 2. Along the horizontal axis, voters to the 
left feel economically threatened, while those on the right do not. This reflects the 
hypothesis that state interventionist attitudes are related to economic fears stemming 
from European integration, while those with economically liberal attitudes should not 
perceive such a threat. Along the vertical axis, respondents at the top end do not feel 
culturally threatened by the integration process, while those to the bottom of the axis 
feel strongly threatened.  
In France, Austria, and Belgium, voters of the extreme right differ markedly from 
those supporting other parties in their position along the cultural dimension of 
European integration, and this location corresponds to the extreme position this 
electorate typically occupies on the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-
communitarian dimension of conflict at the national level (see Bornschier 2005, 
2010). Beyond this commonality, there are also some differences between the three 
countries. Despite the stronger mobilization of cultural anxieties, France presents 
something of the master case, in which cultural and economic fears have been 
mobilized by different political actors. In fact, we saw in Figure 1 that both potentials 
are rather strong in France. However, it is not the small groupings of the extreme left, 
but the much larger Communist party that receives votes from citizens who feel 
particularly threatened in economic terms. This is consistent with prior findings using 
French data, indicating that within the left, the communists mobilize voters that feel 
economically threatened by European integration, while the Socialists receive support 
from those who are economically leftist, but do not feel threatened by the EU 
(Bornschier 2008).  
The results show that a similar division exists within the right in France: Those 
who vote for the Front National are concerned with the cultural implications of 
European integration and differ strongly from those who support parties of the 
mainstream right. Note that the Front National’s voters do not stand out for their 
economic fears related to the integration process, indicating that the party’s 
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Figure 2: The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU 
by party choice – France, Austria, and Belgium 
 
mobilization is almost purely cultural. The populist right faces some competition in 
the cultural domain, however. On the one hand, small independent groupings and 
spin-offs of the right differ from the mainstream right in this respect. Furthermore, the 
voters of the extreme left, contrary to expectations, stand out just as much for their 
cultural as for their economic fears. However, differing from the Front National’s 
quite substantial vote share, only 2% of the respondents declare that they would vote 
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for one of the formations of the extreme left. Furthermore, the position of the extreme 
left is not consistent with analyses of later elections, which show a rather centrist 
location of this electorate along the EU-dimension (Bornschier 2010). 
In Austria, the voters of the Freedom Party also clearly stand out for their cultural 
anxieties. While this is also the electorate that feels most threatened in economic 
terms, these voters are more distinct from those of the other parties in their cultural 
than in their economic orientations. However, the economic potential for opposition 
against the EU being stronger than the cultural one, as Figure 1 has shown, and in the 
absence of a split within the left block, the Freedom Party seems to succeed in 
rallying economic Eurosceptics as well. Preferences for the other parties are weakly 
structured by orientations regarding the EU, although the differences that we do 
observe are in line with expectations: Voters of the left are more concerned with a 
loss of social security than those of the conservatives or the (short-lived) Liberal 
Forum. The ecologists rally voters that are not particularly concerned with either of 
the two threats, which is consistent with their libertarian-universalistic profile along 
the national dimensions of competition (see Dolezal 2005, Kriesi et al. 2006). Finally, 
those who declare they would cast a blanc ballot in a general election also stand out 
for their opposition against the process of European integration, indicating a political 
potential not mobilized by the Freedom Party.  
The Belgian case is not too different from the Austrian one, with the right-wing 
populist Vlaams Blok clearly mobilizing cultural perceptions of threat related to 
European integration. Contrary to Austria, party electorates differ more strongly along 
the cultural dimension.4 The ecologists, who are generally the group of voters with the 
most consistent libertarian-universalistic outlook in Western Europe (Bornschier 
2010, Kriesi et al. 2008), also feel least threatened by European integration in cultural 
terms. They form the counter-pole to those supportive of the Vlaams Blok. No party 
seems to mobilize economic perceptions of threat, and those who vote for the populist 
right are also rather concerned with economic fears related to the EU. The major 
parties’ electorates, on the other hand, do not differ much in their orientations.  
 
                                                
4  The position of the Communists and of the Volksunie makes the economic dimension appear quite 
polarized as well; these positions are somewhat unexpected, and it has be kept in mind that these are 
miniscule formations. 
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Predictable positions, but feeble politicization in the majority of countries on the 
Western European continent 
 
In a second group of countries, party electorates take more or less the expected 
positions relative to one another, but at the same time differ far less in their positions 
than in the countries just discussed. This pattern is found in the Netherlands, 
Germany, Britain, Spain and Italy. Figure 3 shows the example of the configurations 
in three countries. In none of these countries did a significant right-wing populist 
party exist in the mid-1990s, and no party has attracted an over-proportional number 
of voters who feel culturally threatened by the EU. Economic fears have not been 
strongly mobilized in these countries either. Let us discuss the examples of Germany, 
the Netherlands, and Italy in turn. 
In Germany, the electorates of the major parties lie quite close to one another.5 The 
left-wing PDS, on the other hand, attracts the vote of those who most strongly see the 
achievements of the welfare state as endangered by European integration. As we have 
seen earlier on, the economic potentials for contesting the EU are rather strong in 
Germany, in contrast to the cultural potential. Overall, as the hypothesized 
relationship between the state-market cleavage and the economic dimension of 
European integration would lead us to expect, those who vote for parties of the right 
feel less of an economic threat than those who vote for the left. In the cultural domain, 
those who support the Free Democrats and Ecologists feel least threatened, while 
voters of the Christian Democratic Union parties perceive somewhat more of a threat. 
The extreme right attracts voters who are quite distinct from those of the other parties 
in exhibiting strong identity-related fears. However, this electorate is much smaller 
than that of the populist right in other countries. Because of their outmoded program 
and their ties to the fascist past, the parties of the extreme right are highly unlikely to 
attract more than the hard core of xenophobic authoritarians (Bornschier 2010).  
In the Netherlands, the positions of most parties are also rather centrist. The 
configuration shows that the Euroscepticism that became manifest in the recent 
rejection of the constitutional treaty has not been stirred by political parties. The quite 
marginal extreme right-wing Centrumdemokraten take an unexpected position and do 
                                                
5  I do not differentiate between Western and Eastern Germany; the results from an analysis excluding 
Eastern German respondents do not differ significantly from those for unified Germany. 
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not attract voters preoccupied with a loss of identity entailed in European integration. 
Contrary to successful parties of the extreme right, which mobilize along the cultural 
dimension (Bornschier 2010), the voters of the Centrumdemokraten stand out for their 
economic orientations regarding the EU. A number of (fundamentalist) protestant and 
pensioniers’ parties occupy the position we would expect from a right-wing populist 
party, but these parties do not fit in this category and have a rather limited appeal. 
 
 
Figure 3: The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU 
by party choice – Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy 
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The case of Italy, finally, points to an interesting point of variation within this 
second group of countries. First of all, we notice that while economic perceptions of 
fear are not very pronounced, the voters of the Rifondazione Communista nonetheless 
feel more of a threat from economic integration than the other voters. This underlines 
the hypothesis that a split within the left opens the way for a differentiation along the 
economic dimension. Interestingly, while party electorates lie close to one another, we 
note that those in favour of the left-wing PDS are less sceptical regarding the 
economic implications of European integration than those supporting mainstream 
parties of the right such as the Christian Democrats and the Forza Italia. This is a 
pattern characteristic of Southern Europe, and also to be found in Spain and Portugal: 
The mainstream right’s electorate perceives more of an economic threat than voters of 
the left. It is noteworthy, however, that this phenomenon limited to countries in which 
electorates differ little along the economic dimension. 
Overall, despite differing attitudes in the populace, the countries in this group lack 
a modern right-wing populist party that could mobilize cultural fears related to 
European integration. As far as the economic dimension is concerned, the crucial 
condition for the mobilization of economic Euroscepticism actually exists in a number 
of countries. The German, the Italian, the Dutch and the Spanish party systems all 
exhibit a split within the left and one component attracting voters more reluctant of 
economic integration. At the same time, the voters of the PDS, the Rifondazione 
Communista, the Dutch Socialists and of the Spanish Izquierda Unida are not very 
distant from those of the other parties. This could change, however, should issues 
related to European integration gain a more prominent role in these countries. 
 
Cultural opposition from the left: Scandinavia, Portugal, and Greece 
 
In the countries so far, the hypothesis of a rather close association between national 
dimensions of conflict and dimensions of contestation in the EU was generally 
supported. In the Nordic and in two of the Southern European countries, however, 
party positions differ from the predictions made earlier on. Figure 4 shows the 
configurations in Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal. In these countries, as well as in 
Finland and Greece, a split within the left exists and (at least) one component rallies 
ideologically distinct voters with respect to their orientations regarding the EU. In 
22 
Scandinavia, the dominance of the class cleavage and the low electoral threshold has 
allowed various small communist and left-socialist parties to emerge, allowing 
political formations such as the Danish Red-Green Unity List to campaign against 
European integration (Klingemann 2005: 267-274). However, contrary to the cases 
discussed so far, these party systems feature leftist parties that mobilize not only 
economic, but also cultural perceptions of threat related to European integration. The 
 
 
Figure 4: The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU 
by party choice – Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal 
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United Democratic Coalition (an alliance between Communists and Greens) in 
Portugal and in the Communist party in Greece attract voters who stand out above all 
for their cultural fears (Figure 4 shows the example of Portugal). The electorates of 
the other major parties, on the other hand, hardly differ in their position.  
The Scandinavian pattern differs even more fundamentally from those found so 
far. In general, supporters of right-wing parties – conservative and liberal – stand out 
for being much less concerned with the cultural implications of European integration 
than voters of the left. The position of Left Parties in Sweden and Finland and of the 
Red-Green coalition in Denmark suggests that the two dimensions are more strongly 
related than elsewhere: For these voters, economic and cultural Euroscepticism go 
hand in hand. In fact, in an analysis of party positions regarding the accession 
referenda in Scandinavia, Jahn (1999) shows that conservative and liberal parties’ 
pro-market orientation translated into an unambiguously approving stance towards the 
EU. The Social Democrats’ location along the state-market cleavage, on the other 
hand, suggests an ambiguous position characterized by internal divisions. However, 
as many left-wing parties, they have switched to positive stances regarding the Union 
since state interventionist economic policies no longer appear feasible at the national 
level, and instead require an EU-wide approach (Johansson, Raunio 2001). 
In a region where international cooperation has for long been regarded as a threat 
to national sovereignty, and where the parties of the right do not mobilize the defence 
of national sovereignty, opposition to the EU is mobilized by unlikely candidates: 
New Left and – the exception being Finland – Ecologist parties. In fact, Jahn’s (1999) 
analysis shows that parties that have historically been leftist, urban and ecologist or 
post-materialist oppose European integration, while all parties that are materialist and 
urban based supported accession, including the Social Democrats. Left-Socialist 
parties in Scandinavia have a tradition of being opposed to European integration due 
to their pacifist orientation, their rejection of central control, and the perception of the 
EU as a “capitalist” project (Christensen 1996, Jahn 1999), just as Ecologist parties 
fear that the EU dilutes environmental standards (Jahn 1999, Johansson, Raunio 
2001). 
Knutsen’s (1995: 484; 1990) analysis of materialist-postmaterialist value 
orientations shows that the Left Party and the Ecologist party in Sweden, as well as 
the Green and Socialist parties in Denmark stand out for their postmaterialist 
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electorate – while Figure 4 shows that they also attract those voters that feel most 
strongly threatened by the EU in cultural terms. The association between 
economically leftist and culturally protectionist positions found in the analysis 
presented here further suggests that citizens’ national identity in these countries is 
heavily stamped by the uniqueness of the Scandinavian welfare state (see also Raunio 
2007). Indeed, even if social policy were to become more strongly regulated at the 
European level, this would not guarantee the level and universalistic character of 
social protection prevalent in these countries. As non-government parties, Left-
Socialist and Ecologist parties have thus been able to mobilize both economic and 
cultural fears. An analysis based on the European Election Study 2004 (data not 
shown here) shows that the Eurosceptic “June Lists” that ran in the 2004 European 
elections in Denmark and Sweden drew heavily on voters that declare having 
supported the Social Democrat or the Socialist party in the last general election.  
The Danish configuration further qualifies the hypothesis concerning the 
mobilization of opposition against European integration by right-wing populist 
parties. In fact, the voters of the Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party) are not located in 
an extreme position along the cultural dimension. This may have to do with the 
deviance already found in other Scandinavian countries: The cultural line of conflict 
at the national level seems to be related differently to culturally based evaluations of 
the EU than in continental European countries. The finding may, however, also reflect 
the fact that the Scandinavian Progress Parties are not unequivocal members of the 
right-wing populist party family (on this debate, see Mudde 2007, Chapter 2), 
similarly to the Centrumdemokraten in the Netherlands. In 1995, Pia Kjærsgaard left 
the Progress Party and founded the Danish People’s Party, generally considered a 
member of the right-wing populist party family. It will therefore be an interesting 
question whether the Danish People’s Party will begin to mobilize citizens exhibiting 
culturally motivated Euroscepticism, as the other exponents of this party family do. 
This analysis will have to await more recent data. In Sweden, a right-wing party 
mobilizing cultural Euroscepticism existed in the 1990s. However, New Democracy 
was short-lived and is considered a neo-liberal populist, and not a right-wing populist 
party by Mudde (2007: 47-8). Moreover, in openly supporting membership in the EU 
(Jahn 1999: 586), the party’s profile was in disarray with the Eurosceptic orientations 
of its voters put in evidence in Figure 4.  
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What clearly emerges as an important result from the various cases discussed here 
is the necessity to differentiate within the group of extreme right parties, and in 
particular the older from the most recent exponents, which I have termed (extreme) 
right-wing populist. Only this sub-group of the wider extreme right party family, as 
defined at the outset of this chapter, has an appeal broad enough to gain more than 
marginal voter shares (Bornschier 2005, 2010). Furthermore, opposition against the 
EU only seems to be an integral part of this sub-group’s programmatic profile. 
 
The Dimensionality of European Orientations after the Eastward 
Enlargement of 2004 
 
With the accession of ten new member states in 2004, the fifth enlargement of the EU 
has brought the largest number of new members into the Union so far. What is the 
dimensionality of orientations regarding the EU since the enlargement is off the 
agenda, at least for the immediate future? In this final section, I probe into the 
structure of attitudes after this round of enlargement using Eurobarometer 62 from 
2004. Because none of the Eurobarometer surveys after the mid-1990s provides both 
detailed information on citizens’ attitudes regarding the EU, as well as on their 
national party preferences, this brief analysis is solely concerned with the 
dimensionality of EU-orientations.  
The items used in the following analyses come from a battery of questions that is 
identical to the one used in the prior analysis, pertaining to respondents’ fears 
associated with European integration. Because of the more limited number of items as 
well as the much smaller sample as compared to the analysis in the mid-1990s, a one-
dimensional structure emerges. Most probably, this is due to the fact that respondents 
answer the questions on their fears rather uniformly due to the design of the question 
battery.6 As can be seen in Table 1, the same tendency existed in 1996, with the first 
dimension explaining most of the variance before the solution was rotated. Because it 
seems plausible that the one-dimensional structure of orientations is at least partially a 
                                                
6  The battery starts with the question, “Concerning the building of Europe or the EU, are you currently 
afraid of…”, followed by the list of specific objects. Respondents answer the question for one object 
after the other, and the choice is between “currently afraid”, “not currently afraid” and “don’t know”. 
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result of the design of the battery of questions, and since the Eigenvalue of the second 
factor is barely below 1, it makes sense to enforce a two-dimensional solution in order 
to compare these results with those found in 1996. For reasons of comparability, I 
exclude the new member states. Furthermore, Tables 2 and 3 present the results for 
the Scandinavian and the other twelve countries seperately, in order to assess some of 
the hypotheses developed in the preceding section.  
The results of the factor analysis for twelve of the fifteen old member states 
presented in Table 2 reveal a cultural and an economic dimension structuring attitudes 
regarding the EU. The economic dimension is unrelated to questions of identity and 
instead centres on fears regarding the welfare state, the transfer of jobs to other 
countries, and economic crises. The cultural dimension is stamped above all by fears 
pertaining to national identity and language, although some economic items show 
secondary loadings on this factor, above all the preservation of the national welfare 
state. Nonetheless, there is a clear correspondence in these countries between the two 
dimensions found to structure competition in national party systems accross Western 
Europe and the orientations of citizens vis-à-vis the European integration process.  
 
Table 2:  Rotated factor analysis of citizens’ orientations regarding the EU in twelve 
member states, excluding the Scandinavian countries, 2004 
 
Economic 
dimension 
Cultural 
dimension 
Loss of identity 0.19 0.82 
Loss of language 0.09 0.84 
Social security 0.59 0.40 
Transfer of jobs 0.77 -0.01 
Pay more and more 0.68 0.28 
Economic crisis 0.63 0.30 
   
Eigenvalues 
- before rotation 2.61 0.93 
- after rotation 1.85 1.69 
R-square (after rotation) 30.8% 28.2% 
N  10161 
Source: Eurobarometer 62   
The analysis of the mobilization of the cultural and economic potentials in the 
Scandinavian countries in the preceding section suggested that citizens may see 
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European integration as a threat for their identity because economic integration 
endangers their distinctive type of welfare regime. A separate factor analysis of the 
orientations of citizens in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, lends support to this 
hypothesis, as the results in Table 3 show. In these three countries, fears regarding the 
national welfare state as well as economic crises in general are not associated with the 
economic, but with the cultural dimension. The economic dimension, on the other 
hand, is more narrowly defined than in the rest of Western Europe. It is characterized 
by attitudes regarding economic competition – namely, the fear that jobs may be 
transferred to other countries – and the apprehension of having to pay more and more 
for the EU. Interestingly, fears pertaining to the welfare state are only weakly related 
to this economic competition dimension. 
 
Table 3:  Rotated factor analysis of citizens’ orientations regarding the EU in 
Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, 2004 
 
Cultural/welfare 
dimension 
Economic 
competition 
Loss of identity 0.81 0.08 
Loss of language 0.75 0.07 
Social security 0.63 0.32 
Economic crisis 0.63 0.28 
Transfer of jobs 0.02 0.86 
Pay more and more 0.30 0.70 
   
Eigenvalue  
- before rotation 2.51 0.96 
- after rotation 2.05 1.42 
R-square  34.1% 23.7% 
N  2609 
Source: Eurobarometer 62   
 
The analysis thus reveals differences in the structure of attitudes regarding the 
European Union depending on the national context. Most notably, the pattern found in 
Scandinavia is specific. In the light of the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian welfare 
regime, it is quite plausible that commitment to their system of social protection forms 
an integral part of the national identity of Scandinavians. On the other hand, despite 
the fact that parties of the extreme left mobilize cultural fears in Portugal and Greece, 
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these countries do not differ from continental Europe in the structure of their citizens’ 
orientations, as a separate factor analysis for the southern European countries reveals 
(results not shown here). This makes sense since the welfare regime in these countries 
is close to the continental European or Christian Democratic type, and not to the 
universalistic Scandinavian model.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis presented in this paper has put in evidence three potentials for opposition 
against European integration in mass publics across the 15 old member states. Two of 
these – one representing an economic and one a culturally or identity-related form of 
Euroscepticism – are theoretically related to the dimensions of conflict prevalent at 
the national level. Consequently, we may expect national parties to take up and 
politically represent these potentials. The third potential was constituted in the mid-
1990s by citizens sceptical of the eastward enlargement of the EU. With the question 
of enlargement more or less off the agenda for the time being, an analysis of citizen 
orientations in 2004 has confirmed that distinctive economic and a cultural 
dimensions structuring citizen attitudes vis-à-vis the European Union can be 
distinguished.  
It has been the fusion of economic and cultural Euroscepticism in referendum 
campaigns that have led to the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France and in the 
Netherlands, and that has put a halt to the integration process. For the most part, 
however, the two motives for opposing the EU are mobilized by different political 
parties and also have strongly diverging implications for the future of the EU. The 
culturally or identity-based resistance against European integration is theoretically 
closely related to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community. These 
conceptions have been constructed and mobilized by right-wing populist parties, who 
see cultural pluralism as a danger to the distinct cultural traditions of national 
communities, and supra-national integration as a threat to the autonomy of the 
traditional political community. Thus, divergence in perceptions of cultural threat 
deriving from European unification mirror the conflict between libertarian-
universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values, which prior research has 
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shown to be one of the two most important dimensions of opposition in a number of 
Western European countries, namely in France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and Britain. 
While many citizens lie somewhere in the middle ground between universalistic 
and communitarian understandings of community, the traditionalist-communitarian 
conception in its extreme form seems incompatible with a European identity, which 
implies the emergence of a post-traditionalist political community. Hence, citizens 
holding such values may well support a Europe of nations, but they are unlikely to 
accord legitimacy to an EU that, since Maastricht and the eastward enlargement, 
increasingly impinges on individuals’ life situation, as well as on the distribution of 
resources, as set out in Fuchs (2008). In other words, the scepticism of citizens 
holding strongly traditionalist-communitarian values vis-à-vis the EU is likely to be 
fundamental. 
On the other hand, different perceptions of fears related to social security and the 
transfer of jobs to other member countries mirror contrasting attitudes concerning the 
desired extent of market regulation at the European level. The resulting potential for 
political conflict thus reproduces the state-market cleavage at a higher level. In 
national politics, distributive conflicts have proven much more amenable to political 
compromise and pacification than cultural conflicts, which are often of an either-or 
nature. To the extent that parties take up voters’ contrasting positions on this issue, 
this conflict can be processed by the democratic institutions at the national and EU 
levels, and a legitimate compromise may be achieved. The prerequisite for the 
acceptance of majority decisions that have redistributive effects and impinge on the 
distribution of life chances, however, is the existence of a European identity that 
creates a certain degree of solidarity between citizens living in different member 
countries of the EU. 
In terms of the mobilization of the economic and cultural potentials for 
contestation of European integration, three patterns emerge. In a number of countries, 
namely in Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy, contrasting attitudes regarding the 
EU remain weakly mobilized, and the differences in European outlook between 
electorates correspondingly small. In the mid-1990s, this also applied to Britain, 
although the Conservatives mobilized Euroscepticism later on in the 1990s (Kriesi, 
Frey 2008). It also has to be kept in mind that the UK Independence Party has been 
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highly successful in that country at least in the 2004 European elections. Despite the 
feeble degree of polarization, a potential for the representation of contrasting attitudes 
regarding the EU exists in these countries, since the national and European 
dimensions prove to be related. In fact, the attitudes party electorates take concerning 
the two European dimensions of conflict are those that we would predict in 
knowledge of their positions concerning the two national dimensions of conflict. With 
the exception of Britain, the major parties in these countries have not mobilized on the 
issue of European integration, however, either because they are internally divided, or 
because no political actor has politicized the issue in the national arena.  
Where alternatives to the established major parties of the left and right parties 
exist, however, contrasting attitudes regarding the integration project have been 
mobilized, although electorates do not differ in outlook to the same degree in all of 
these cases. This hypothesis has been strongly confirmed both for economic and for 
culturally based opposition against the EU. A split within the left ideological block 
has permitted left-wing parties to mobilize economic Euroscepticism in France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, as well as in Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. 
While the mobilization of economic opposition remains modest to date, the cultural 
dimension has been mobilized far more strongly in those cases where right-wing 
populist parties have achieved an electoral breakthrough. In this distinct group of 
countries, parties of the populist right rally voters who are distinct by virtue of their 
culturally based scepticism regarding the EU. This is the case of those supporting the 
French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Vlaams Blok in Belgium. 
The mobilization of these parties is likely to represent the most severe threat for the 
formation of a European identity. Furthermore, in the French case, where a split 
exists both within the left and within the right, and where both dimensions have been 
politicized rather strongly, the economic logic of mobilization of the Communists and 
the cultural mobilization logic of the Front National are clearly distinguishable.  
While these results are in line with expectations, a third group of countries features 
left-wing parties whose voters are characterized both by economic, and by cultural 
fears associated with European integration. This suggests that the two orientations 
may go hand in hand for certain groups of voters. In Denmark, Sweden and Finland, 
this is part of a more general specificity. In Scandinavia, cultural fears are generally 
more widespread among the voters of the left than among voters of the right. As 
opposed to theoretical expectations, the cultural dimension at the national level and 
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cultural orientations regarding the EU are related inversely to the pattern found in the 
rest of Western Europe. In other words, cultural liberalism is associated with cultural 
Euroscepticism, which seems to derive from the perception that universalistic and 
ecologist values can be more effectively defended at the national than at the EU level. 
Thus, the European project may be viewed differently in the various national contexts. 
Furthermore, those who believe their economic interests are better protected by 
national welfare states than with supranational integration may also develop an 
identity-based Euroscepticism. Contrary to an opposition against European integration 
that stems from traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, however, 
this is not necessarily an opposition of principle against the EU. Rather, whether these 
fears will be tempered if EU membership and economic integration prove to be 
compatible with the variety of national welfare regimes that exist in Europe.7 Finally, 
the mobilization of cultural Euroscepticism by extreme left-wing parties in Portugal 
and Greece merits further research.  
                                                
7  The „varieties of capitalism“ perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001) suggests that this is the case. 
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